2025 marks the end of the first half of the 2020s, a decade that has seen the geopolitics of\nsemiconductors take on a significance and resonance rarely, if ever, seen before. The trigger for\nthis explosion of interest was undoubtedly the Covid-19 pandemic, which led to a crisis in car\nproduction due to a shortage of semiconductor components \u2013 chips. The impact, including on\npublic opinion, of the long delays in car deliveries, with serious economic and social consequences,\nhas prompted Western politicians to recognise the strategic role of microelectronics in our society\nas an essential lever for economic, technological, and social development. Microelectronics is the\nenabling technology of our daily lives, which are increasingly and pervasively based on information\nand communication tools and technologies. However, of the 1,000 billion chips produced each\nyear, three-quarters come from factories in the Far East, mainly in China, Taiwan, Korea, and\nJapan. Europe\u2019s share of chips produced on the continent has more than halved since the\nbeginning of the century.
Starting in 2022, ambitious public and private investment plans have rapidly emerged, namely the\nEuropean Union\u2019s Chips Act and the CHIPS for America Act in the US, which aim to restore\nproduction capacities that had migrated to the Far East in previous decades. This migration has\nbeen facilitated by entrepreneurs capable of developing new business models, such as Morris\nChang at TSMC in Taiwan, and by the foresight of governments that have continuously supported\nthe development of advanced technologies through appropriate actions. Among these, the\nChinese government, at national and provincial levels, has taken on a leading and supportive role,\nhaving already emphasised in 2014 the fundamental importance of developing a national\nmicroelectronics industry, a point repeatedly reiterated by President Xi Jinping.
In Europe, we have been distracted (or thought it was not worth the effort to produce chips that\ncould be easily bought in a globalised world) for several decades. Now we are trying to make up\nfor lost time and, above all, lost know-how, with the European Commission\u2019s ambitious goal of\nbringing the share of chips produced in Europe on the global market back to 20%. Unfortunately,\nwe are starting from a low level, well below 10%, with a significant absence in technological nodes\nbelow 10nm and in the markets for AI components, led by GPUs. At the same time, we remain\nwell-positioned in components for industrial and automotive applications, which, however, are\nthreatened by the invasion of Chinese electric cars. At the halfway point of the first five years of\nthe 2020s, the outlook is not rosy. Intel, on which Germany and Poland had placed high\nexpectations for factories dedicated to chip production and testing and assembly, respectively,\nafter announcing in mid-2023 that it would build these factories, decided in September 2024 to\npostpone their construction for at least two years due to the serious problems afflicting it.\nConfirming the company\u2019s difficulties, Intel CEO Pat Gelsinger resigned on 1 December due to the\nfailure of his project to revitalise a company that has lost its technological leadership, investor\nconfidence, and, let\u2019s not forget, the enthusiasm of its employees, who are facing the threat of\nmass redundancies. At the time, critical voices were raised, including in Germany, about the\ndecision to rely on Intel but involve other players with advanced technologies, but they were not\nlistened to.
In Italy, investments have focused on two very different initiatives, which complement the\ndevelopment of more scaled technologies for silicon integrated circuits (such as those planned in\nGermany and France), but are no less important. In June 2024, Minister Urso announced a \u20ac3.2\nbillion project to build a Silicon Box factory in Novara, a \u201cunicorn\u201d start-up founded in Singapore\nand dedicated to the assembly of silicon chips (chiplets) using innovative procedures. In Catania,\nboth a pilot line, involving the CNR and universities, and a full-scale 200 mm production line (with\n\u00a35 billion in investment) will be developed by STMicroelectronics for silicon carbide components, a\nwide energy gap semiconductor whose importance is growing in line with the demand for efficient\nelectricity conversion systems, starting with the electric car and renewable energy markets. In\nboth cases, in 2024, the European Commission approved state funding to support the construction\nof the facilities, which will also be privately financed by the companies involved and are expected\nto be fully operational by 2033.
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, in this case too, each European country has dealt separately\nwith private companies to attract investment for the construction of semiconductor factories,\ncompeting with other European countries, without the capacity \u2013 or real possibility \u2013 of\ncoordination by the Brussels authorities. In this fragmented scenario, shaken by nationalist\npressures and at the mercy of decisions made by major players (the US and China, but also the\nBRICS countries, which are emerging with India\u2019s $15 billion investment), it is to be hoped that the\ngoal of increasing chip production in Europe will be maintained by the Commission and, above all,\nby the various countries. The statements of principle \u2013 semiconductors are the basis of global\ntechnological competition \u2013 repeatedly reiterated in Europe should be translated into a long-term\nindustrial policy, even in the face of temporarily unfavourable economic conditions. We should be\nwell aware of both the importance of the sector and its volatility \u2013 it declined in 2023 after the\n2022 boom but recovered to 2023 levels last year, and forecasts are for growth in 2025. We have\nalready lost essential companies in the past due to political short-sightedness and corporate\nlimitations, and other countries have taken full advantage of this; we trust that this will not\nhappen again.
From this observatory, we will try to follow the technological and geopolitical evolution of the\nsemiconductor world: 2025 promises some fascinating developments, starting on 20 January.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Alessandro Paccagnella <\/p>\n\n\n\n
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Col 2025 si chiude la prima met\u00e0 del decennio 202x che ha visto la geopolitica dei semiconduttori acquisire un rilievo e una risonanza raramente \u2013 e forse mai – viste in passato. Detonatore di questa esplosione di interesse \u00e8 stata senza dubbio la pandemia da Covid-19 con la crisi della produzione delle automobili, innescata dalla […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":2228,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2227","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-approfondimento"],"yoast_head":"\n